Pecking order and market timing theory in emerging markets: The case of Egyptian firms by Allini, Alessandra et al.
Accepted refereed manuscript of:  Allini A, Rakha S, McMillan D & Caldarelli A 
(2018) Pecking order and market timing theory in emerging markets: The case 
of Egyptian firms, Research in International Business and Finance, 44, pp. 297-
308. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ribaf.2017.07.098  
 
© 2017, Elsevier. Licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-
NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International 
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/  
 1 
 
Pecking order and market timing theory in emerging markets: 
The case of Egyptian firms 
Alessandra Allini, Department of Economics, Management, Institutions, University of Naples 
“Federico II”, Via Cintia, Monte S. Angelo, 80126 Naples, Italy 
Soliman Rakha, Business Administration Department, Damietta University, New Damietta, Egypt  
David G. McMillan, Accounting and Finance Division, Stirling Management School, University of 
Stirling, Stirling FK9 4LA, United Kingdom  
Adele Caldarelli, Department of Economics, Management, Institutions, University of Naples 
“Federico II”, Via Cintia, Monte S. Angelo, 80126 Naples, Italy 
 
Abstract 
Using a unique dataset of 1270 Egyptian listed firm-year observations over 2003–
2014, we investigate whether the basic premises according to the pecking order or 
market timing theories provide an explanation for the capital structure mix of 
Egyptian firms. Current work has provided mixed evidence in regard to these 
capital structure theories in the Egyptian context. Our results show that the most 
profitable firms are less likely to resort to external financing. However, in case 
where financial deficits exist then equity issued appears to track the deficit rather 
than debt. Moreover, issuances appear to track deficit periods instead of market 
timing attempts. Results obtained support notion that the typical Egyptian firm 
follows revised pecking order theory, with the importance of the four conventional 
determinants, profitability, tangibility, size effect and growth opportunity in debt 
holdings. 
 
Keywords: Capital structure; Pecking order theory; Market timing theory; Egypt 
 
Accepted for publication in Research in International Business and Finance published by 
Elsevier. The published version is available at: 10.1016/j.ribaf.2017.07.098 
  
 2 
 
1. Introduction 
The questions of how firms finance their operations and how they mix their capital structure 
have loomed large since the influential studies of Modigliani and Miller (1958, 1963) on 
capital structure irrelevancy. While it is widely recognised that the capital structure 
irrelevance theory is based on a set of unrealistic assumptions, it has been praised as the 
cornerstone of the modern finance over the past few decades (Ardalan, 2017). Subsequently, 
numerous studies have sought to explain the difference between observed capital structures 
across firms. This has led to a literature that is rich in variables designed to explain the 
influences upon capital structure decisions (see, Harris and Raviv, 1991). 
The current study aims to provide a critical evaluation of two of the main contradictory 
capital structure theories. These are the pecking order theory (henceforth, POT) and market 
timing theory (henceforth, MTT). To do so, we use a panel data of firms from the Egyptian 
stock market (henceforth, EGX), which one of the oldest and, in terms of research, most 
untapped emerging markets. 
Such an analysis is important for several reasons. To the best of our knowledge, this is the 
first study examining these two theories in the Egyptian context. As such, the findings will be 
of direct relevance to those agents involved in the Egyptian capital market, such as regulators, 
investors and firms. Perhaps more importantly, existing research is typically focused on 
developed markets and the US in particular. By considering an emerging market, this is, in 
effect, providing out-of-sample evidence for one or other of the above theories and thus 
stronger support for that theory. 
The POT predicts that firms would prefer to rely on internal financing before issuing new 
securities. When firms are forced to obtain external financing, they would prefer secured 
debt, followed by risky debt before, finally, equity financing (Myers, 1984; Myers and 
Majluf, 1984; Shyam-Sunder and Myers, 1999). One theoretical challenge to POT comes 
from the MTT which argues that market timing has a significant and lasting effect on capital 
structure. Here, the firm’s capital structure is a cumulative outcome of previous attempts to 
time the stock market through both issuances and repurchases or retirements (Baker and 
Wurgler, 2002; Hovakimian, 2006; Kayhan and Titman, 2007). 
Several studies examining capital structure across different countries emphasize the role of 
country-specific factors, such as institutional frameworks and national culture. Such factors 
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are likely to differ across developed and emerging markets (Rajan and Zingales, 1995; Booth 
et al., 2001; Acedo-Ramírez and Ruiz-Cabestre, 2014; Antonczyk and Salzmann, 2014; 
Belkhir et al., 2016). Moreover, the Egyptian market (similar to other emerging markets) is 
distinguished by two features which may prevent the generalisation of previous studies, on 
developed markets, to the Egyptian market. First, the Egyptian market is relatively less 
efficient compared to developed markets. Second, the information asymmetry and adverse 
selection problems are more severe within the Egyptian market than within developed 
markets (Ebaid, 2009; Eldomiaty and Ismail, 2009). 
Furthermore, previous work also advocates the inability of any sole theory to provide a 
sufficient explain for corporate financing choices. Instead, it appears more realistic to 
consider a range of factors and theories in order to obtain a full understanding of firm’s 
capital structure decisions (e.g., Shyam-Sunder and Myers, 1999; Myers, 2001; Frank and 
Goyal, 2003; Fama and French, 2005). The few studies that have been conducted within the 
Egyptian context are primarily focused on the effect of leverage on financial performance and 
the determinants of such leverage (see, Ismail and Eldomiaty, 2005; Ebaid, 2009; Eldomiaty 
and Ismail, 2009; Wahba, 2014; Belkhir et al., 2016). Therefore, this study fills gap within 
the Egyptian context and provides fertile ground for a comparison with results been drawn 
from developed economies. 
To ensure the robustness of this study, we utilize a large and unique panel dataset that covers 
approximately half of the listed firms over the period from 2003 to 2014. 
In preview of our results, we find mixed evidence for the two capital structure theories. Our 
findings suggest that the typical Egyptian firm prefers to rely on internal funds as its main 
financing source, which supports the predictions of the POT. However, in case of financial 
deficits, the magnitude of equity issued exceeds than of debt, which contradicts the 
predictions of the POT. Moreover, when observing the MTT assumptions, we do not find 
support for market timing attempts in Egyptian firms. This implies that the issuance activity 
of firms seems to be correlated with deficits instead of exploiting windows of opportunities in 
the equity market. Our results also emphasize the role of profitability, tangibility, size and 
growth opportunity within debt financing, which, in turn, reflects the emerging nature of the 
Egyptian market. In sum, we argue that Egyptian firms follow a revised pecking order theory, 
where equity is preferred to debt. 
 4 
 
The implications of these results will be useful to EGX regulators in structuring and 
developing capital markets, for managers in recognizing the need for a long-run vision for 
financing needs in order to reduce financing cost, and for investors in understanding how 
firms operate and providing reliable information for the benefit of investment decisions. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a brief review of the prior 
literature; Section 3 describes the data and descriptive statistics; Section 4 discusses the 
models and variables definitions; Section 5 presents the findings and discussion and Section 6 
concludes. 
2. Literature review 
2.1. Pecking order theory 
Myers (1984) argues that firms do not have a targeted capital structure, instead firms would 
prefer to rely on internal financing rather than issuing new securities. Myers and Majluf 
(1984) advocate that due to the heterogeneity of information among market players (insiders 
and outsiders), firms prefer safe issuances and thus would rely on retained earnings as much 
as possible, only when investment opportunities exceed their cash flows would they utilise 
debt markets for external financing and in preference to more risky equity would act as a last 
resort to the extent that the firm may give up profitable opportunities rather than finance by 
risky securities. 
In order to test POT empirically, Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) consider examining the 
empirical predictions of the theoretical model, in which firms rely on internal financing 
sources whenever possible. Only in the case of a financial deficit will the firm consider a 
hierarchy of external financing choices, in which secured debt is favoured, followed by risky 
debt and then equity. Their findings assert that POT is an excellent first-order descriptor of 
corporate financing behaviour for their firms sample. 
Subsequently, further research has considered the empirical validity of the theory. Booth et 
al. (2001) reports findings across ten developing countries that are consistent with the POT, 
with the more profitable firm exhibiting a lower debt ratio. Sánchez-Vidal and Martin-Ugedo 
(2005) report that most Spanish firms adopt POT, whereby they tend to cover their financial 
deficits mainly with long term debts. Lemmon and Zender (2010) find that POT is a good 
descriptor of the observed financing behaviour for a wide cross section of firms, when 
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controlling for debt capacity. Degryse et al. (2012) results support the POT behaviour in 
Dutch small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), noting that after internal funds, long-term 
debt is the next preferred source of capital. Tongkong (2012) provides further support for 
POT among Thai real estate companies, as high profit firms tend to have less debt, while high 
growth firms have higher debt ratios. Oino and Ukaegbu (2015) also show that firms in 
Nigeria follow POT to a certain extent. Chauhan (2016) finds a strong support for the pattern 
of financing as predicted by POT for firms in India. 
Further to this, another branch of this research has identified what is referred to as a 
"modified” or “revised” POT. Chen (2004) notes that capital choice decision in Chinese firms 
seems to follow this modified POT, in which firms rely on retained profit, then equity, with 
long-term debt as a last option. Delcoure (2007) reveals that POT is insufficient to explain all 
financing patterns in central and eastern European countries. Instead, firms tend to follow the 
modified model of POT – namely retained earnings, equity, bank loans with debt's markets as 
a final choice. Wang and Lin (2010) revisited the POT and report that high market value 
firms are willing to issue equity while those with low market value issue debt. Strictly, they 
argued that the original POT could be reversed. 
Other empirical studies, however, contradict the POT’s predictions. For instance, Frank and 
Goyal (2003) reveal that although external financing is heavily used between U.S. firms. The 
debt financing however does not dominate equity financing in magnitude, and net equity 
issuance tracks financing deficit closer than debt. Fama and French (2002, 2005) argue that 
financing decisions running against POT. They report that equity issuance is both common 
and increasingly among U.S. firms from 1973 to 2002 and is related with financially 
constrained firms, also equity retiring is not rare. Flannery and Rangan (2006) also report 
findings inconsistent with the predictions of the POT. They argue that hierarchy behaviour 
only explains a small part of observed capital structure. Gaud et al. (2007) provide evidence 
that POT does not offer a suitable description of the capital structure policies in Europe. 
Karadeniz et al. (2009) show that POT is not able standalone for a complete explanation for 
capital structure of Turkish companies. Leary and Roberts (2010) report that POT exhibits 
poor performance in describing debt-equity issuance decisions. So that after allowing for 
variation in firms’ debt capacities, they observe only fewer than 20% of firms follow the POT 
predictions. Chen et al. (2013) note that in the Taiwan stock market, net equity tracks the 
financial deficit much closer than debt issues do. They also show that the equity finance is 
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greater than debt finance in most of the periods they consider. Komera and Lukose (2015) 
also reject the argument that firms follow POT in making their financing choices. They argue 
that debt does not dominate equity financing with Indian firms issuing a substantial amount 
of equity to cover their financial deficits 
Finally, it has been noted that the original POT model exhibits some limitations. Namely, 
Chirinko and Singha (2000) argue that POT empirical model has a little power to distinguish 
between plausible patterns of external financing, which might lead to incorrect inference. 
Myers (2001) also argues that POT, as with other capital structure theories, works better 
under some conditions than others. Researcher may report results consistent with one theory 
even when actual financing decisions are determined by another. This implies that POT needs 
further support to distinguish it from other theories to be fully supported. 
2.2. Market timing theory 
While POT assumes semi-strong market efficiency, MTT does not rely on such an 
assumption. Therefore, a range of opportunities occurs as long as the cost of equity varies for 
either rational or irrational reasons. MTT has emerged due to the fact that a firm’s financial 
settings changes over time, and that market inefficiencies can have important implications for 
corporate finance. Lucas and McDonald (1990) discuss the information-based model for the 
equity issuance decisions and finds that equity issuers on average have positive abnormal 
returns preceding the issuing. This implies that all firms whether overvalued or undervalued 
will try to time the equity market. However, both timing paths would differ due to the 
variance of adverse selection across firms. Ritter (1991) studies the variation across time- and 
industry-dependence of the long-run performance of initial public offerings, he show that the 
long-run underperformance of IPOs, year-to-year and across industries vary widely, meaning 
that issuing firms are trying to exploit “windows of opportunityˮ. 
Choe et al. (1993), based on analysis issue periods, reveals that firms sell seasoned equity 
when they face lower adverse selection costs. Thus, firms try to time the equity market in 
periods with more promising opportunities and with less uncertainty about assets in place. 
This finding suggests that the adverse selection varies across time. Loughran and Ritter 
(1995) point out that the firm will face a decline in performance in the long-run after stock 
issuance, confirming the hypothesis that firms exploit the temporary window of opportunity 
by issuing shares when significantly overpriced. Baker and Wurgler (2002) document that 
market timing behaviour has a large and permanent effects on firm’s capital structure. They 
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argue that the capital structure simply is a cumulative outcome of attempts to stock market 
timing. MTT posits that as information asymmetry and adverse selection change over time, 
the financing order would not be static, which contradicts POT. 
Frank and Goyal (2004) note that a high market-to-book ratio is associated with subsequent 
debt reduction; however, they did not report any effect on equity issuing. Alti (2006) 
confirms the existence of market timing behaviour. He shows that hot-market IPOs firms 
issue substantially more equity, and have lower leverage ratios compared to cold-market 
firms. Hovakimian (2006) documents a significant negative impact of historical market-to-
book ratios on capital structure. Although, he argues that the importance of historical average 
market-to-book ratios in leverage regressions is not due to past equity market timing but 
instead that historical ratios work as a proxies for growth opportunities. Bie and Haan (2007) 
find evidence of market timing by Dutch firms. They note that stock price run-ups lead to 
lower leverage and increase the probability of issuing equity rather than debt. 
According to Kayhan and Titman (2007), firms’ histories strongly influence their capital 
structures, since stock price changes and financial deficits affect capital structure changes. 
Gaud et al. (2007) provide evidence supporting the equity market timing approach where 
firms will take advantage of favourable market conditions. Huang and Ritter (2009) find that 
firms fund a larger proportion of their financing deficit with equity issues when the relative 
cost of equity is low. The historical values of equity cost would have long-lasting effects on 
firm’s capital structure. Chen et al. (2013) show that market timing approach seems more 
favoured in the Taiwan stock market, since net equity tracks the financial deficit more closely 
than debt issues. 
Accordingly, it is hard to argue that corporate financing decisions are made in accordance 
with a unique capital structure theory. Instead, it is more reasonable to assume that it is 
affected by different factors, internal (i.e. financial deficits) and external (i.e. market 
valuations) which requires further investigation. Our paper intends to add new insights to the 
studies by Ismail and Eldomiaty (2005) and Eldomiaty and Ismail (2009), testing for the first 
time whether POT and MTT are able, at once, to explain the capital structure decisions in the 
Egyptian market. 
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3. Data and summery statistics 
3.1. Data and sample 
The Egyptian Exchange (EGX) – consisting Cairo and Alexandria – is one of the oldest stock 
market established in the Middle East. EGX was established in 1883 in Alexandria, followed 
by the Cairo Stock Exchange in 1903. EGX was very active in the 1940s and was ranked as 
the fifth in the world. The central planning and socialist policies adopted in the mid-1950s led 
to the market becoming dormant till 1990s. Following an economic reform program and 
privatization, the EGX has again grown. Over the period from 2002 till 2014, EGX has seen 
high growth rates in trading volumes (from LE 904mln to LE 57,231mln), in trading values 
(from LE 34,176bln to LE 290,749bln) and in market capitalization (from LE 122bln to LE 
500bln) (EGX Annual reports, 2002:2014). In addition, EGX annual performance based on 
Morgan Stanley Capital International Index (MSCI Index) ranged from 1.59% to 29.36%, 
compared with −6.00% to −1.82% for the emerging markets index, and with −18.98% to 
4.71% for all countries world index, in 2002 and 2014, respectively (www.msci.com). 
Therefore, we believe that the Egyptian stock market is a useful testing ground that merits 
further examination. The empirical analysis is conducted over the capital structure of 214 
publicly-traded firms, published by EGX, covering the time-series for past twelve years from 
2003 to 2014. Financial firms, utilities firms and firms with relatively missing data were 
excluded from our analysis. We obtain 106 firms with total 1270 firm-year observations. 
Table 1 describes the structure of our panel dataset. 
Table 1. Structure of Panel Dataset. 
A: Number of Observations on Each Firm 
N. of Observations on Each Firm N. of Firms 
11 2 
12 104 
Total 106 
B: Number of Observations by Each Year 
Year N. of Observations 
2003 105 
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B: Number of Observations by Each Year 
Year N. of Observations 
2004 106 
2005 106 
2006 106 
2007 106 
2008 106 
2009 106 
2010 106 
2011 106 
2012 106 
2013 106 
2014 105 
Total 1270 
C: Number of Firms by industrial sectors according to ICB Supersector 
Industrial Sectors N. of Firms 
Basic Resources 7 
Chemicals 6 
Construction & Materials 19 
Food & Beverage 18 
Health Care 8 
Industrial Goods & Services 8 
Media 1 
Oil & Gas 2 
Personal & Household Goods 9 
Real Estate 15 
Retail 1 
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C: Number of Firms by industrial sectors according to ICB Supersector 
Industrial Sectors N. of Firms 
Technology 1 
Telecommunications 3 
Travel & Leisure 8 
Total 106 
It is worth noting that our sample (106) represents about 50 per cent of the total 214 listed 
firms in 2014. Our sample also includes those firms that contribute to the main indexes of the 
Egyptian Exchange, i.e., EGX30 and EGX100. Moreover, the market capitalization of our 
sample (LE 271bn) represents 54 per cent of the total market capitalization for all listed firms 
(LE 500bn) in Dec. 2014. Further, our sample size is larger than used in previous studies in 
the Egyptian context (see,Ebaid, 2009; Eldomiaty and Ismail, 2009; Wahba, 2014). Table 1C 
shows that the sample is slightly concentrated in the construction, food industries and real 
estate but no single industry dominates the sample. 
3.2. Descriptive statistics 
Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics of our variables. Egyptian firms appear to use debt 
financing unlike a typical firm in other emerging markets, the average debt ratio 17% is a 
very far from 51% in developing countries (Booth et al., 2001), 46% in Chinese firms (Chen, 
2004), 56% in Poland, 51% in Slovakia, 43% in the Czech Republic, and 34% in Russia 
(Delcoure, 2007). Further, the Egyptian firm’s debt ratio either 17% for book-based debt, or 
14% for market-based debt, seem very low compared with those in some developed countries 
as 39% and 35% in Canada, 48% and 41% in France, 38% and 23% in Germany, 47% and 
46% in Italy, 53% and 29% in Japan, 28% and 19% in United Kingdom, and 37% and 28% in 
United States, respectively for book- and market-based debt ratios, (Rajan and Zingales, 
1995), also very low than 49% in Dutch SMEs (Degryse et al., 2012). These substantially low 
ratios of debts might reveal that equity capital financing is not rare nor might it be the last 
option for the Egyptian firms. The poor and inefficient bond markets, hard terms required and 
the strict control imposed by banks might force firms to prefer equity issues instead of bank 
loans. 
Table 2. Summary Statistics. 
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 NTD NNQ DEF BTD MTD LSA TAN PRF MTB EFWAMTB 
Obs. 1264 1264 1264 1270 1270 1270 1270 1270 1270 1158 
Mean 0.0190 0.0698 0.1302 0.1702 0.1440 13.2068 0.3478 0.1243 1.4851 1.8028 
Std Dev 0.2725 0.4081 0.6848 0.2073 0.1735 1.6762 0.2378 0.1196 1.1612 4.9147 
Min −0.9008 −0.4699 −0.6163 0 0 8.2626 0.0001 −0.7084 0.3503 0 
Median 0 0.0145 0.0510 0.0912 0.0762 13.1198 0.3476 0.1163 1.2011 0.3036 
Max 8.1631 12.0034 20.2768 0.7869 0.6949 18.3687 0.8775 0.5252 5.5690 16.6450 
NTD 1.0000          
NNQ 0.6638 1.0000         
DEF 0.8589 0.8725 1.0000        
BTD 0.1754 −0.0123 0.0570 1.0000       
MTD 0.1140 −0.0327 0.0241 0.8143 1.0000      
LSA −0.0056 −0.0475 −0.0124 0.1565 0.1865 1.0000     
TAN 0.0215 −0.0300 −0.0223 0.2268 0.2880 0.2377 1.0000    
PRF −0.0808 0.0279 −0.0247 −0.3279 −0.2514 0.1846 0.1033 1.0000   
MTB 0.0630 0.0291 0.0298 0.2014 −0.2092 −0.0937 −0.1375 0.0209 1.0000  
EFWAMTB 0.0211 0.0036 0.0220 −0.0217 −0.0305 −0.0344 −0.0390 0.0619 0.0318 1.0000 
Notes: NTD: net debt issued; NNQ: net equity issued; DEF: financial deficit, BTD: book-based debt; MTD: 
market-based debt; LSA: firm’s size; TAN: tangibility; PRF: profitability; MTB: market-to-book ratio; 
EFWAMTB: “external financing weighted average” market-to-book ratio. 
It is worth noting that the high mean and max values of net equity issued compared with net 
debt issued may refer to the preference of Egyptian firms to issue equity rather than debt in 
case of deficits. In turn, they may prefer to retire debt than equity in case of surpluses 
(negative deficits). The implication is that, in Egyptian firms, the equity issuance is usually 
higher than debt issuance; in contrary, the debt retirement seems higher than equity 
retirement, indeed even more so than the financial surplus. This appears to contradict the 
view that equity financing is scarce in Egyptian firms. In addition, the high values of MTB 
and EFWAMTB ratios implies that there are widows of opportunities in Egyptian equity 
market. 
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In Table 3 we report the Kruskal-Wallis test in order to determine if there is a significant 
amount of variation across firms, industrial sectors and years. The Chi-sq statistics are 
significant for all variables across firms, except for EFWAMTB ratio. Also the Chi-sq 
statistics are significant for most variables across industrial sectors, except for financial 
deficit and EFWAMTB ratio which seem not significantly differ across sectors. Lastly, Chi-
sq statistics are significant for most variables across years, except for net debt issued and 
tangibility which seems not to significantly differ over time. 
Table 3. Kruskal–Wallis rank test for variables across firms, industrial sectors and years. 
Variables Chi-sq across firms Chi-sq across sectors Chi-sq across years 
NTD 195.590*** 32.326*** 17.087 
NNQ 154.028*** 43.831*** 74.753*** 
DEF 163.536*** 12.585 45.115*** 
BTD 822.852*** 208.574*** 50.035*** 
MTD 802.583*** 190.709*** 73.613*** 
LSA 1158.523*** 258.500*** 47.538*** 
TAN 1076.258*** 425.415*** 2.209 
PRF 841.984*** 233.364*** 42.073*** 
MTB 567.392*** 124.930*** 164.190*** 
EFWAMTB 94.260 14.681 192.906*** 
Notes: NTD: net debt issued; NNQ: net equity issued; DEF: financial deficit, BTD: book-based debt; MTD: 
market-based debt; LSA: firm’s size; TAN: tangibility; PRF: profitability; MTB: market-to-book ratio; 
EFWAMTB: “external financing weighted average” market-to-book ratio. 
*** 
Indicates significance at 1% level. 
 
 
4. Models and variables 
4.1. Pecking order model 
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To test original POT, we adopt the methodology of Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) and 
empirically investigate the relation between debt issuance and the financial deficit. Assuming 
that firms will not issue new stocks after the initial public offering, the financing deficit 
should equal to net debt issues in normal operating conditions. The model has been widely 
used to verify POT (see, Chirinko and Singha, 2000; Frank and Goyal, 2003; Huang and 
Ritter, 2009; Lemmon and Zender, 2010; Komera and Lukose, 2015). Thus, the restricted 
model for original POT is given by Eq. (1): 
(1)NTDi,t=β0+βpoDEFi,t+ei,t. 
Where, NTDi,t is the amount of debt issued (new debts), or retired, β0 is the equation constant, 
βpo is the pecking order coefficient that under the original POT should equal one and eit is the 
random error term. The firm's funds deficit has defined as the change in total assets minus 
change in retained earnings, as proposed by Fama and French (2005) and in later studies 
(e.g., Huang and Ritter, 2009; Komera and Lukose, 2015). Further, definition of the financial 
deficit been adopted by Watson and Wilson (2002) and tested by Sánchez-Vidal and Martin-
Ugedo (2005) to examine how firms finance the deficit in assets growth. The variables NTDi,t 
and DEFi,t are normalized by the fiscal year-end total assets for firm i at time t-1. 
 
Interestingly, Chirinko and Singha (2000) argue that because of the presence of debt capacity 
constraints, the relation between net debt issued and financing deficit would be concave. To 
capture such a quadratic nature and identify the differences in financing choices between 
large and small deficits, Eq. (1) is augmented with the square of the financial deficit, DEFi,t2 
(Lemmon and Zender, 2010; Komera and Lukose, 2015). Thus, our unrestricted model for 
the original POT becomes: 
(2)NTDi,t=β0+βpoDEFi,t+βpo,sqDEFi,t2+eit. 
Should Egyptian firms follow the original POT but are constrained by concerns over debt 
capacity, then this should result in a significantly negative βpo,sqcoefficient, an increase in the 
βpo coefficient, and an increase in the R-square (Chirinko and Singha, 2000; Lemmon and 
Zender, 2010; Komera and Lukose, 2015). 
If the original POT holds then debt will dominate as the source of external financing. 
Alternatively, should the revised POT prevail then equity will be the preferred source of 
external financing. If this is the case then we would expect to have a relation between net 
equity issuance and the financing deficit. Therefore, to test the revised POT we follow Chen 
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et al. (2013) and substitute the NTDi,t in Eq. (1) with NNQi,t. Hence, the restricted model for 
revised POT is given by: 
(3)NNQi,t=β0+βpoDEFi,t+ei,t. 
Where NNQi,t is the amount of equity issued (new equity) or retired (if DEFi,t is negative), 
again normalized by the fiscal year-end total assets for firm i at time t-1. as with the model 
for the original POT, we also introduce a squared term to capture any constraints on funding. 
Thus, the unrestricted model of revised POT is given by: 
(4)NNQi,t=β0+βpoDEFi,t+βpo,sqDEFi,t2+ei,t. 
4.2. Market timing model 
To investigate MTT, we utilize the regression model of Baker and Wurgler (2002) and 
Hovakimian (2006) that includes the EFWAMTB ratio variable alongside the four common 
explanatory variables which explained by Harris and Raviv (1991) and then empirically 
tested by Rajan and Zingales (1995) into a simple cross-sectional model, firm size, 
tangibility, profitability, and market to book ratio. Thus, the model which we estimate as in 
Eq. (5): 
(5)Di,t=λ+ψ1LSAi,t+ψ2TANi,t+ψ3PRFi,t+ψ4MTBi,t+ψ5EFWAMTBi,t−1+ηi+εit. 
Where, D is the firm’s capital structure; LSA is the firm’s size; TAN is the tangibility; PRF is 
the profitability; MTB is the market-to-book ratio; EFWAMB is the market timing variable. 
Following previous works, the variables are proxied as follow: 
Capital structure (D) is the ratio of total debt relative to the value of assets. We utilized two 
measures for capital structure based on computing capitalization, when equity is measured by 
book value, we term it as book-based total debt (BTD), and when equity is measured at year-
end market value, we term it as market-based total debt (MTD) (see, Rajan and Zingales, 
1995; Frank and Goyal, 2009; Chakraborty, 2010; Chen et al., 2013). 
Firm's size (LSA) is gauged by the natural logarithm of book value of assets. Tangibility 
(TAN) is measured by net property, plant, and equipment relative to book value of assets. 
Profitability (PRF) is measured by EBITDA relative to book value of assets, based on 
previous works (see, Chen, 2004; Delcoure, 2007; Frank and Goyal, 2009; Degryse et al., 
2012; Antonczyk and Salzmann, 2014; Komera and Lukose, 2015, Bandyopadhyay and 
Barua, 2016; Belkhir et al., 2016). 
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Market-to-Book ratio (MTB) is measured by the market value of assets (book value of 
assets minus book value of equity plus market value of equity) divided by book value of 
assets. Market value of equity is stock price multiplied by shares outstanding. Following up 
previous works (see, Rajan and Zingales, 1995; Baker and Wurgler, 2002; Frank and Goyal, 
2003, 2009; Hovakimian, 2006; Chen et al., 2013; Belkhir et al., 2016). 
The market timing proxy (EFWAMB), which is the “external finance weighted-averageˮ 
market-to-book ratio, summarizes the relevant historical variation in market valuations; 
following previous works (e.g., Baker and Wurgler, 2002; Hovakimian, 2006; Bie and Haan, 
2007) we calculate EFWAMB as in Eq. (6). 
(6)(MB)efwa,t−1=∑s=0t−1es−ds∑r=0t−1er+dr×(MB)s, 
Where, e is net equity issued, measured as change in book equity minus change in retained 
earnings; d is net debt issued, defined as the change in total debt. Then, for a firm observed at 
time t, the EFWAMB is the weighted average of a time series of past market-to-book ratios, 
starting with the first observation in the sample and ending at (t–1). The weight for each year 
is the ratio of external financing in that year to the total external financing raised by the firm. 
Hence, firms that issue securities when their market-to-book ratios are relatively high will 
tend to have high EFWAMB values, and in follow with Baker and Wurgler (2002) the 
negative weights are reset to zero. 
4.3. Financial deficit as an additional explanatory variable 
If Egyptian firms follow the predictions of the POT, then the inclusion of the financial deficit 
variable in a capital structure regression model should render the effects of four conventional 
explanatory variables insignificant; if not so then the predictions of the theory would be 
contradicted. (see, for example, Frank and Goyal, 2003; Chen et al., 2013; Komera and 
Lukose, 2015). Thus, we regressed the financial deficit term, together, with the four 
conventional determinants of firm’s capital structure level. The model which we estimate is: 
(7)Di,t=λ+ψ1LSAi,t+ψ2TANi,t+ψ3PRFi,t+ψ4MTBi,t+φDEFi,t+ηi+εi,t. 
Where, variables definitions as outlined in subsections 4.1 and 4.3. 
5. Findings and discussion 
5.1. Pecking order findings 
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The above-stated models in Eqs. (1)–(4) were estimated by carrying out the most three 
common static linear panel data models, namely, Pooled-OLS, Fixed-effects and Random-
effects regression, respectively, as reported in Table 4. Diagnostic tests for models 
assumptions were performed. Heteroscedasticity and serial correlation are two problems that 
can affect the output of estimation models. Testing for heteroscedasticity was performed for 
the null hypothesis of homoscedastic by White-Koenker test using both levels and squares 
(White, 1980), as well modified Wald test for groupwise heteroscedasticity (Greene, 2003). 
Testing for serial correlation was performed by Wooldridge’s serial correlation test 
(Wooldridge, 2002). Results in Table 4, under models (1) and (2) in Panel A and under 
models (7) and (8) in Panel B show only the presence of heteroscedasticity. Accordingly, 
both pooled-OLS and fixed-effects models (either restricted or unrestricted model) were 
performed with Driscoll-Kraay standard errors (Hoechle, 2007). Furthermore, Akaike 
Information Criterion (AIC) and Bayesian information Criterion (BIC) as the two most 
commonly used model selection criteria, were conducted for comparison between restricted 
and unrestricted models (Frank and Goyal, 2009; Wahba, 2014). 
Table 4. Thee Estimators for Pecking Order Model. 
 Panel A: Original POT − Dependent Variable (NTD) Panel B: Revised POT − Dependent Variable (NNQ) 
 Pooled-OLS Fixed-Effects Random-Effects Pooled-OLS Fixed-Effects Random-Effects 
 Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) Model (5) Model (6) Model (7) Model (8) Model (9) Model (10) Model (11) Model (12) 
DEF 0.340***(0.037) 0.143***(0.046) 0.339***(0.034) 0.136***(0.041) 0.340***(0.006) 0.143***(0.011) 0.519***(0.048) 0.360**(0.082) 0.517***(0.043) 0.354***(0.079) 0.519***(0.008) 0.360***(0.017) 
DEFi,t2  0.013***(0.002)  0.013***(0.002)  0.013***(0.001)  0.010***(0.004)  0.011***(0.004)  0.010***(0.001) 
R2 0.730 0.795 0.728 0.795 0.730 0.795 0.758 0.777 0.754 0.774 0.758 0.777 
No. Obs. 1264 1264 1264 1264 1264 1264 1264 1264 1264 1264 1264 1264 
F statistic 85.60*** 10371.45*** 99.89*** 12994.59***   118.37*** 879.56*** 141.74*** 1019.57***   
Wald χ2     3415.51*** 4876.27***     3959.58*** 4393.58*** 
F-test 0.87 1.01     0.75 0.77     
B-P LM test 0 0     0 0     
Hausman Test 0.79 4.14     0.59 1.09     
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 Panel A: Original POT − Dependent Variable (NTD) Panel B: Revised POT − Dependent Variable (NNQ) 
 Pooled-OLS Fixed-Effects Random-Effects Pooled-OLS Fixed-Effects Random-Effects 
 Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) Model (5) Model (6) Model (7) Model (8) Model (9) Model (10) Model (11) Model (12) 
White/Koenker 
test 
443.586*** 586.321***     568.667*** 989.975***     
Mod. Wald 
test 
4.9e+05*** 8.7e+06***     1.2e+05*** 1.9e+05***     
Wooldrige test 0.285 0.035     1.616 1.092     
AIC −1352.215 −1694.539 −1448.517 −1805.28   −470.815 −570.514 −1448.517 −1805.28   
BIC −1341.931 −1679.112 −1438.233 −1789.854   −460.531 −555.088 −1438.233 −1789.854   
Notes: NTD: the net debt issued, or retired; NNQ: the net equity issued, or retired; DEF: financial deficit; 
DEFi,t2.: financial deficit squared. White ⁄ Koenker heteroscedasticity test was performed using both levels and 
squares of IVs. Pooled-OLS and Fixed-effects models were performed with Driscoll-Kraay standard errors, 
correcting heteroscedasticity problem. Values been expressed in parentheses are standard errors. 
*** 
Indicates significance at 1% level. 
With a view to the overall fit of the estimation model, the F-test was performed to decide 
between pooled-OLS and fixed-effects models (Greene, 2003), Results stated in Table 4 
under models (1) and (2) in Panel A and under models (7) and (8) in Panel B show that 
pooled-OLS model is preferred. Hausman (1978) specification test also was conducted to 
decide between fixed-effects and random-effects models (Baltagi, 1995; Greene, 2003). 
Results stated in Table 4 under models (1) and (2) in Panel A and under models (7) and (8) in 
Panel B show that random-effects estimator is consistent. Furthermore, the Breusch and 
Pagan (1980) Lagrange Multiplier test (henceforth, B-P LM) was also conducted to decide 
between pooled-OLS and random-effects models (Green, 2003). Results stated under models 
(1) and (2) in Panel A and under models (7) and (8) in Panel B in Table 4 confirm that 
pooled-OLS is the most proper to test either original or revised pecking order model. As a 
final point for these results, both the AIC and BIC indicate a preference for the unrestricted 
model (i.e., the model that includes the squared financial deficit term). 
Although the results stated in Table 4 under Pane A support a positive and significant 
coefficient of financial deficit on net debt issued. Yet, the estimated coefficient on financial 
deficit as 0.340 is still far below the theoretical coefficient suggested by Shyam-Sunder and 
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Myers (1999) of being equal to one. Likewise, far below from observed coefficient in the 
U.S. market, that ranging between 0.75 and 0.85 (See, Shyam-Sunder and Myers, 1999). 
Sánchez-Vidal and Martin-Ugedo (2005) also held coefficients range from 0.65 to 0.94 for 
Spanish firms. Furthermore, the coefficient value decreases with inclusion the square of 
financial deficit, which in turn exerts a positive and significant coefficient, contradictory with 
POT predictions. And in terms of the model specification tests, the R-squared values range 
from 73% to 80%. The results suggest that Egyptian firms do not follow the POT premise 
when making their financing choices and taken together with the above studies suggest a 
difference between developed and emerging markets. Alternatively, revised POT model is 
considered. 
Interestingly, the results stated in Table 4 under Panel B exert a positive and significant 
coefficient of financial deficit on net equity issued. Moreover, it has a greater magnitude 
(0.519) than the corresponding value under the original POT. Furthermore, the coefficient 
value decreases (still also greater than obtained value under the original POT) with inclusion 
of the square of financial deficit, which in turn exerts a positive and significant coefficient. 
The R-squared values range from 76% to 78%. This confirms that in Egyptian context, net 
equity issued is more related to financial deficit rather than net debt issued. This result holds 
across the six models considered (i.e., the restricted and unrestricted model for the three 
estimation approaches). 
In Sum, In case of financial deficit, Egyptian firms seem more reliant on equity rather debt. 
Explanations for this result could include the lack of, or even absence of, the Egyptian bond 
market, insufficient corporate profits to meet debt obligations and the absence of strict laws 
to maintain equity holders’ rights compared to the rigorous obligations toward debtholders. 
Accordingly, in Egyptian context, equity financing appears more attractive and potentially 
cheaper than debt. An alternative explanation might lie in the attempts by Egyptian firms to 
time the equity market. Thus, we now consider the MTT. 
5.2. Market timing findings 
The above-stated models in Eq. (5) was estimated also by carrying out the Pooled-OLS, 
Fixed-effects and Random-effects regression, for both BTD and MTD, as reported in Tables 
5 and 6, respectively. Results in Tables 5 and 6, under models (1), (3) and (5) show the 
presence of both heteroscedasticity and serial correlation problems. Accordingly, pooled-
OLS model was performed with clustering standard errors, fixed-effects model was regressed 
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by Prais–Winsten panel corrected standard errors that is robust to heteroscedasticity and the 
cross-sectional autocorrelation, as well, random-effects model was performed by Generalized 
Least Square (GLS) estimator with (AR1) (either BTD or MTD model). The F-test, as well 
AIC and BIC criteria show that fixed-effects is preferred over the pooled-OLS model. B-P 
LM test reveals that random-effects is preferred than pooled-OLS model. However, Hausman 
specification test shows that fixed-effects is preferred over random-effects model. The 
implication of these results is that the fixed-effects model is the appropriate model to test the 
market timing model (either BTD or MTD model). The R-squared values are 32% and 33% 
for BTD and MTD models, respectively. 
Table 5. Three Estimators for Book-based Debt. 
Dependent 
Variable:  BTD 
Pooled-OLS Fixed-Effects Random-Effects 
 Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) Model (5) Model (6) 
LSA 
0.0237*** 
(0.0082) 
0.0233*** 
(0.0081) 
0.0283*** 
(0.0048) 
0.0293*** 
(0.0045) 
0.0195*** 
(0.0064) 
0.0156** 
(0.0065) 
TAN 
0.2253 
***(0.0523) 
0.2269*** 
(0.0521) 
0.1457*** 
(0.0299) 
0.1296*** 
(0.0290) 
0.0884*** 
(0.0304) 
0.0907*** 
(0.0295) 
PRF 
-0.6691*** 
(0.1229) 
-0.6678*** 
(0.1169) 
-0.4892*** 
(0.0492) 
-0.5135*** 
(0.0488) 
-0.4424*** 
(0.0408) 
-0.4440*** 
(0.0394) 
MTB 
0.0450 ٭ 
(0.0241) 
0.0419 ٭ 
(0.0246) 
0.0337*** 
(0.0078) 
0.0340*** 
(0.0075) 
0.0316*** 
(0.0030) 
0.0326*** 
(0.0029) 
EFWAMTB 
0.0001* 
(0.0001) 
 
0.0001 
(0.0001) 
 
0.0001 
(0.0001) 
 
DEF  
0.0132* 
(0.0074) 
 
0.0087* 
(0.0049) 
 
0.0102*** 
(0.0031) 
R2 0.272 0.257 0.323 0.330 0.260 0.244 
No. Obs. 1158 1264 1158 1264 1158 1264 
F statistic 14.56*** 15.19***     
Wald χ2   200.12*** 224.55*** 235.37*** 261.82*** 
F-test 12.74*** 12.88***     
B-P LM test χ2 1436.47*** 1564.47***     
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Dependent 
Variable:  BTD 
Pooled-OLS Fixed-Effects Random-Effects 
 Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) Model (5) Model (6) 
Hausman test χ2 18.61*** 27.08***     
White ⁄ Koenker 
test χ2 
383.497*** 404.503***     
Mod. Wald 
test χ2 
5.3e+05*** 4.1e+05***     
Wooldrige test 48.607*** 62.631***     
AIC −731.694 −753.383 −1685.095 −1734.233   
BIC −701.367 −722.531 −1654.769 −1703.381   
Notes: BTD: book-based debt; LSA: firm’s size; TAN: tangibility; PRF: profitability; MTB: market-to-book 
ratio; EFWAMTB: external financing weighted average market-to-book ratio; DEF: financial deficit. White ⁄ 
Koenker heteroscedasticity test was performed using both levels and squares of IVs. Pooled-OLS model was 
performed with clustering standard errors. Fixed-effects model was performed by Prais–Winsten panel corrected 
standard errors with (AR1). Random-effects model was performed by R-E GLS estimator with (AR1). Values 
been expressed in parentheses are robust standard errors. * and *** indicate significance at 10 and 1% levels, 
respectively. 
Table 6. Three Estimators for Market-based Debt. 
Dependent 
Variable: 
MTD 
Pooled-OLS Fixed-Effects Random-Effects 
 Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) Model (5) Model (6) 
LSA 
0.0163*** 
(0.0058) 
0.0160*** 
(0.0060) 
0.0188*** 
(0.0039) 
0.0198*** 
(0.0037) 
0.0132** 
(0.0053) 
0.0136** 
(0.0056) 
TAN 
0.1800*** 
(0.0403) 
0.1888*** 
(0.0419) 
0.1392*** 
(0.0257) 
0.1359*** 
(0.0243) 
0.0902*** 
(0.0252) 
0.0810*** 
(0.0251) 
PRF 
-0.4117*** 
(0.0606) 
-0.4296*** 
(0.0609) 
-0.3249*** 
(0.0347) 
-0.3492*** 
(0.0329) 
-0.2818*** 
(0.0340) 
-0.2992*** 
(0.0334) 
MTB 
-0.0207*** 
(0.0062) 
-0.0241*** 
(0.0071) 
-0.0200*** 
(0.0028) 
-0.0206*** 
(0.0029) 
-0.0182*** 
(0.0025) 
-0.0182*** 
(0.0025) 
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Dependent 
Variable: 
MTD 
Pooled-OLS Fixed-Effects Random-Effects 
 Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) Model (5) Model (6) 
EFWAMTB 0.0001**(0.0001)  
0.0001 
(0.0001) 
 
0.0001 
(0.0001) 
 
DEF  
0.0059 
(0.0049) 
 
0.0035 
(0.0032) 
 
0.0004 
(0.0026) 
R2 0.215 0.210 0.334 0.336 0.208 0.201 
No. Obs. 1158 1264 1158 1264 1158 1264 
F statistic 21.28*** 18.91***     
Wald χ2   222.44*** 258.05*** 154.22*** 165.85*** 
F-test 1.89*** 9.47***     
B-P LM 
test χ2 
945.78*** 1035.27***     
Hausman 
test χ2 
21.31*** 34.70***     
White ⁄ 
Koenker 
test χ2 
78.968*** 89.856***     
Mod. Wald 
test χ2 
1.3e+05*** 1.1e+05***     
Wooldrige 
test 
201.116*** 142.261***     
AIC −1172.976 −1128.790 −1922.476 −1914.915   
BIC −1142.650 −1097.938 −1892.149 −1884.063   
Notes: MTD: market-based debt; LSA: firm’s size; TAN: tangibility; PRF: profitability; MTB: market-to-book 
ratio; EFWAMTB: external financing weighted average market-to-book ratio; DEF: financial deficit. White ⁄ 
Koenker heteroscedasticity test was performed using both levels and squares of IVs. Pooled-OLS model was 
performed with clustering standard errors. Fixed-effects model was performed by Prais–Winsten panel corrected 
standard errors with (AR1). Random-effects model was performed by R-E GLS estimator with (AR1). Values 
been expressed in parentheses are robust standard errors. ** and *** indicate significance at 5 and 1% levels, 
respectively. 
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Table 5 reports the results for book-based debt. Results reveal that the firm’s size, tangibility 
and market-to-book ratio have a significant positive impact, while profitability has a 
significant negative coefficient, otherwise, EFWAMTB ratio have a non-significant positive 
impact on Egyptian firms’ capital structure. Table 6 displays the results for market-based 
debt, confirming the significant positive coefficient of both size and tangibility, the 
significant negative coefficient of profitability, non-significant positive coefficient of 
EFWAMTB ratio, whilst, market-to-book ratio has a significant negative impact on market-
based debt. 
Referring to the relationship between firm’s size and capital structure, our results contradict 
the POT predictions, which assumes a negative sign, due to informational asymmetries 
becomes lower in larger firms, that then lead to more equity issuance. Our findings however 
consistent with previous evidence in various countries (e.g., Rajan and Zingales, 1995; Booth 
et al., 2001; Baker and Wurgler, 2002; Frank and Goyal, 2003, 2009; Chen, 2004; Bie and 
Haan, 2007; Delcoure, 2007; Degryse et al., 2012; Tongkong, 2012; Chen et al., 2013; 
Antonczyk and Salzmann, 2014; Komera and Lukose, 2015; Oino and Ukaegbu, 2015). One 
possible explanation is that size works as inverse proxy for the bankruptcy probability, 
financial distress costs and agency costs of debt, which implies better terms and lower cost of 
debt financing (Rajan and Zingales, 1995; Frank and Goyal, 2009). Moreover, firm size may 
also acts as a proxy for firm reputation. Lenders will be willing to lend larger firms than 
smaller ones especially in emerging markets, where the risk aversion is common. 
Additionally, larger Egyptian firms might have more access ability to capital market, and 
have a better negotiation position with banks, since they employ high-skilled staff who 
fabricate a stronger bargaining position towards lenders. 
Regarding the relationship between tangibility and capital structure, also the results contradict 
POT that assumes a negative relationship, on the basis that firms with more tangible assets 
would face lower asymmetric information and thus more reliance on equity, and vice versa. 
Our results are consistent with previous evidence in other countries (e.g. Rajan and Zingales, 
1995; Booth et al., 2001; Baker and Wurgler, 2002; Frank and Goyal, 2003, 2009; Chen, 
2004; Delcoure, 2007; Karadeniz et al., 2009; Chakraborty, 2010; Degryse et al., 2012; Chen 
et al., 2013; Antonczyk and Salzmann, 2014; Komera and Lukose, 2015; Bandyopadhyay and 
Barua, 2016). The implication is that tangible assets are important in Egyptian context, since 
they can be used as collateral in order to help to overcome information problems and to 
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attract debt financing. Additionally, it reduces the agency costs of debt, implying better terms 
and lower cost of debt financing. 
Regarding profitability, our findings fully concur with the POT arguments about the inverse 
relation, as firms, generally, rely less on information-sensitive sources and prefer to use 
internally funds. This result is consistent with previous evidences (e.g., Rajan and Zingales, 
1995; Booth et al., 2001; Baker and Wurgler, 2002; Frank and Goyal, 2003, 2009; Bie and 
Haan, 2007; Karadeniz et al., 2009; Chakraborty, 2010; Chen et al., 2013; Oino and 
Ukaegbu, 2015). Such a relation, particularly, seems more relevant for emerging markets, due 
to their typical features and firms’ limited access ability to external financing market. 
Especially in a country like Egypt, with less efficient equity market, poor bond market and a 
semi bank-oriented financial system, the profitability role becomes vital, either in short-run to 
meet dividends and current needs, or in long-run as retained earnings to meet investments 
needs. The managers also may perceive retained earnings as the quickest and easiest 
financing source (Chen, 2004; Delcoure, 2007). At variance with relevant papers in Egyptian 
context, i.e. Ismail and Eldomiaty (2004) and Eldomiaty and Ismail (2009), our result 
documents the essential role of profitability as a debt financing determinant. 
Market-to-book ratio results are mixed. That is, when employing book-based debt we report 
an significant positive relation. The same result is documented by other studies, e.g., Booth et 
al. (2001) in a set of emerging markets, Tongkong (2012) in Thai firms and Baker and 
Wurgler (2002) in U.S. firms. One explanation consistent with POT is that if market-to-book 
ratio works as a proxy for future opportunities, the highly-growth firms would face a greater 
asymmetric information problem and then in case of insufficient internal flows, they will 
accumulate debt to meet investments needs, hence, positive relation would notice. Contrary, 
by observing market-based debt, we report significant negative relation in consistent with 
previous evidence (e.g., Rajan and Zingales, 1995; Frank and Goyal, 2003; Chen et al., 2013; 
Komera and Lukose, 2015). Possible explanations that might drive the negative sign; first, 
firms with high market-to-book ratios have higher financial distress costs (Rajan and 
Zingales, 1995). Second, in accordance with MTT, firms might time equity market by issuing 
equity whenever the market-to-book ratio is high (Loughran and Ritter, 1995; Rajan and 
Zingales, 1995). 
Last, with respect to the EFWAMTB ratio, we find that the historical market-to-book ratios 
don’t have a long-lasting effect on Egyptian firms’ capital structure, as it held insignificant 
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positive coefficient. This implies that capital structure does not reflects cumulative attempts 
to timing stock market. Contradicting the market timing premises and in contrast with 
previous works (Baker and Wurgler, 2002; Hovakimian, 2006; Huang and Ritter, 2009; Bie 
and Haan, 2007). However, such result consistent with Leary and Roberts (2010) and 
Chauhan (2016) that the issuance activity of firms seems to be uncorrelated with market 
reactions. 
5.3. Further analysis for financial deficit as an additional explanatory variable 
Referring to our further analysis, we now examine the financial deficit as an additional 
explanatory variable and how its inclusion affects the above four noted variables. Table 5 
under models (2), (4) and (6) reports the results for book-based debt. Results reveal that the 
financial deficit variable is significant. However, we can see that its inclusion does not affect 
the significance of the four conventional variables outlined. Moreover, there is no gain in 
terms of the R-squared value. Thus, it appears that this term offers little in explanatory power 
for the debt ratio. Table 6 under models (2), (4) and (6) as well displays the results for 
market-based debt, confirming that adding the deficit variable to the regression did not have 
much effect on the magnitudes and significance of the coefficients on the conventional 
variables. Thus, we can confirm reject of the pecking order theory in Egyptian firms. 
This result is consistent with previous work, including Helwege and Liang (1996) who find 
that the financial deficit does not appear as a crucial determinant of firm's debt ratio. Equally, 
Frank and Goyal (2003) find that the financing deficit does not account for the effects of the 
conventional variables. Adding that the financing deficit only adds a small amount to the 
performance of the fitted model. Komera and Lukose (2015) also document that the 
introduction of the financial deficit in leverage specifications does not influenced the signs, 
magnitudes, and significance of the coefficients of conventional factors. 
6. Conclusions 
Employing panel data analysis, we investigate whether the basic premise of the pecking order 
and market timing theories can provide a complete explanation for the capital structure 
behaviour for Egyptian listed firms. We utilized a panel dataset of 1270 firm-year 
observations for about half listed firms from 2003 to 2014. 
Consistent with the pecking order approach, our results confirm a negative and significant 
impact of profitability on capital structure. However, the estimated pecking order coefficient 
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is far away from its theoretical value. Considering the revised pecking order approach, where 
equity is preferred to debt, stronger evidence is found, although, again, the estimated 
coefficient is below the theoretical value. 
Our findings suggest that historical market-to-book ratios have not a significant effect on 
Egyptian firms’ capital structure. As such, this provides no support for market timing 
attempts by Egyptian firms. Taking these results together, issuance activity in Egyptian 
context appears more closely to the need of funds instead of exploiting any windows of 
opportunity that may exist in equity markets. This may arise due to capital constraints faced 
by the firms. Hence, firms may not be able to issue adequate debt or equity when facing 
favourable market conditions. Another possible explanation is the absence of any long-term 
vision for future financial needs by Egyptian Managers. Thus, they will not be able to benefit 
from favourable market times. 
Ultimately, we document that internally generated funds is the preferred option for Egyptian 
firms. Then, equity, where a financial deficit is present, and finally debt finance as a last 
resort. This may reflect the weakness of the debt market and restrictions imposed by banks as 
a major source of debt funds. 
This study supports the literature that argues neither pecking order nor market timing theory 
are sufficient to provide a satisfactory explanation for capital structure behaviour. 
Nonetheless, our results are consistent with several studies (e.g., Titman and Wessels, 1988; 
Rajan and Zingales, 1995; Frank and Goyal, 2009) that highlight the importance of four key 
characteristics – profitability, tangibility, firm size and the market-to-book ratio – as strong 
determinants of capital structure. 
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